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Abstract 
Music has the power of establishing a sense of personal closeness and of confirming 
the existence of a meaningful reality. This is because it creates, or imitates a face-to-
face situation in which participants experience the same events during shared time. 
Face-to-face interaction is the primary means by which humans are able to conduct a 
“reality check” in the face of chaos, sense of meaninglessness and unreality. However, 
this interaction is basically “about nothing”; in this sense, it is an instance of “pure 
sociality”. Musical phenomena are semiotic in nature only insofar as they do not 
stand for themselves, but for something else. When describing social facts and social 
practices, we are heavily dependent on words and concepts. At the same time, the arts 
do, by definition, endeavour to bring about experiences that are untranslatable to any 
other form of expression. Arts sociologists’ answer to this dilemma has most often 
been to turn away from the arts themselves and to concentrate instead on the social 
fields and activities that surround them. This essay suggests a perspective of music 
as interaction creating an intersubjectively shared experience. At the same time, it is 
admitted that music, similarly to any other kind of interaction, can also fail in this, or 
be used deliberately for exclusion. This essay invites discussion on possible uses of 
this perspective in sociological and cultural research.
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A person with whom I was close once recollected painful 
experiences and moral dilemmas of his youth. As many other people 
have done, he had felt confronted by what, as Camus puts it in The 
Myth of Sisyphus, is the only “truly serious philosophical problem” 
(Camus, 1991 (1942): 3). In a distressed state of mood, it happened 
that he attended a symphony concert where some of Ludwig van 
Beethoven’s works were played. After the concert he concluded that 
as long as it was possible to go and listen to Beethoven’s music, he 
would never commit suicide. 
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Camus (Ibid: 6) explains suicide with a sudden, possibly intu-
itive insight into the ridiculousness and emptiness of the routine we 
call life; of the lack of meaning of our sufferings and everyday activ-
ities. “[I]n a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man 
feels an alien, a stranger.” 
What happened at that concert? Or, put in another way, through 
which means is a musical experience, in this case the experience of 
listening to Beethoven’s music, able to restore reliance on the existence 
of a meaningful universe? In the present attempt to find answers, I will 
discuss performing and listening to music as reality maintenance, as 
practices that confirm our feeling of being in touch with a reality that 
has a meaningful structure. Drawing on the insights of phenomenolog-
ical and constructionist sociology, I will further argue that the reality 
maintaining function of an experience is due to its embeddedness in 
social interaction – the intersubjective nature of that experience affirms 
the individual’s connection with a humanity that shares his own af-
fections, concerns, delights, joys and sorrows. I am certainly not the 
first to say that, for instance, musical experience can have this quality. 
Having said that music is a type of social interaction, be it also said that 
it is of a specific type: It is not carried out with the help of a language, 
in the sense that it is not dependent on the use of symbols. A musical 
gesture of course may, but does not need to refer to anything outside 
the music itself. The existence of interaction and sociality outside the 
realm of symbols poses a problem both to sociological and other re-
search on arts. A discussion of why it has often been overlooked, and 
the challenges it implies for the sociology of the arts, will be proposed. 
The music I will more specifically refer to in this essay belongs 
to a tradition I feel confident enough to discuss – Western concert mu-
sic of the last two or three centuries. This neither implies that other 
traditions or styles would not deserve attention, nor that I would not 
think that what I am saying about music does, at least to some extent, 
apply to them. A question I cannot answer here is in exactly what ways 
the ideas of this essay are applicable to music cultures in which the 
relationship between the musical event and the participants is radically 
different from that of the early to late modern Western culture. The lat-
ter is the chief point of departure of the present discussion; to explore 
its wider applicability remains the task of musical anthropology. 
1. The Musical Experience as Reality Maintenance
The existential anxiety described by Camus is echoed by the 
centrality that phenomenological and constructionist sociologists at-
tribute to a strain between our constructions of reality and the chaos 
of a reality void of inherent meaning. “All social reality is precarious. 
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All societies are constructions in the face of chaos” (Berger & Luck-
mann 1991 (1966): 21). As I see it, this statement should not be seen 
as a factual one: Of course, many of the ideas and social relations 
we cherish are remarkably robust, able to be maintained over long 
periods of time, through critical situations of various kinds. Instead, 
it is a methodological statement, intended to highlight the various 
practices we use in order to secure the mutual predictability of action 
by people we are in contact with. According to this line of thought, 
societies, culture and any social interaction are possible because we 
bestow our environment and actions with meaning, simultaneously 
convinced that our understanding of it is similar to that of our fellow 
human beings. In ordinary circumstances, our constructions of reality 
do not appear problematic. There are, however, situations in which 
they become radically challenged. We can recall marginal situations 
created by dreams, artistic experiences, philosophical or religious 
meditation, or by contacts with death, that call into question the real-
ity and meaning of what we call real. 
Faced with challenges of this kind, society responds with what 
Berger and Luckmann call symbolic universes: meta-level constructions 
of reality that are able to contain and order all conceivable realities, and 
to explain or dismiss experiences that divert from the meanings jointly 
agreed upon. The symbolic universe has the powerful nomic function of 
putting “everything in its right place” again (Ibid: 116). 
In music (and poetry), one of the most masterful and famous 
examples of a fight between a marginal experience and its interpreta-
tion from the point of view of everyday reality is found in Schubert’s 
(2005 (1821)) Lied of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s poem, The Al-
der King. It depicts a father’s ride through a night landscape with his 
fever-ridden son. During the ride, the boy hears first the seducing, 
then the threatening calls of a mythical Alder King, or the King of the 
Elves. The father repeatedly calms his son, dismissing his visions of 
the Alder King as the wind through dried leaves, the view of ancient 
willows, or, as in the example below, a foggy strain. In the end, the 
father reaches their destination, a farmstead, but the boy is no longer 
alive. Among the challenges of the singer is to impersonate four char-
acters: The narrator, the father, the son, and the Alder King. 
The boy’s cries of anguish grow more and more dissonant and 
the tonality becomes ambiguous, but the father always – except the 
last time – gives a reassuring answer while the accompaniment again 
establishes the main tonality. In measures 44–46 of the example, the 
tonality progresses from C minor to B♭ minor, but the passage from 
measures 51 to 53 again could be either in minor or major – until 
the major third is introduced in measure 54. After that, a perfect ca-
dence in measures 55–58 confirms that we have indeed returned to 
226
Музикологија  2016 1(20) Musicology
the Lied’s main tonality. For the composer, the performers, and the 
listeners, the cadence’s progression from and back to the tonic chord 
through the subdominant and dominant corresponds to the poet’s re-
ality of explicable natural phenomena. It is a return to the natural 
order of things – and to what is beautiful (cf. Wittgenstein 1979: 29).3
Example 1. The Alder King (excerpt) 
Schubert’s Lied is tonal, despite the tensions he introduces; 
consequently, a solution of those tensions by means of a return to the 
main tonality is what the listener expects. Moreover, this was what 
Western listeners to any piece of music in Schubert’s lifetime would 
have expected, and what they most often do expect even today. For 
most of us, a return to the original form of a 12-tone row after a 
Krebsgang would not have the same effect.
For the record, I am not claiming any “natural” status for the 
tonalities preferred by West European professional musicians from 
the 17th to the early 20th centuries. On the contrary, the tempered 
scale’s equalling of 12 fifths with 7 octaves involves a conscious and 
3  ”When people find a flower or an animal ugly, they always have the feeling that they 
are artificial products. ‘It looks like…’, they say. This sheds some light on the meaning 
of the words ‘ugly’ and ‘beautiful’.” 
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carefully calculated deviation from natural harmonics.4 However, 
for those of us socialized within that tonal system, it gives us the 
reassurance of being situated “in the most real world possible”, much 
in the same way as any trivial and predictable things in our everyday 
life (such as weather reports and help-wanted ads in a morning paper) 
(Berger & Luckmann 1991 (1966): 116).
The feeling of predictability in music is of course supported by 
numerous other things besides tonality – the dynamics, the length of the 
phrases, or for an alert and knowledgeable listener, such recognizable 
structures as the classical sonata form. A skilful composer is able to 
create a strain between familiar and unexpected elements, first leading 
us to emotional arousal, suspense and uncertainty by frustrating our 
expectations, and then to an emotional release by a return to the 
expected (Meyer 1970 (1956): 28). When performing or listening to 
such passages, not only do we feel satisfaction when recognizing the 
final return to familiar domains, we also feel mentally close to the 
composer when we understand that, Oh yes, this is where he was 
heading, this was where he wanted to lead us. 
What we have been looking at until now is the relationship 
between a solitary listener and an artefact. Even that can be seen 
as a social relationship, insofar as it involves even those who have 
produced the artefact, even if they are not physically present (cf. 
Elias 1970: 130. And, if we consider a recorded performance, even 
the musicians’ efforts become part of the artefact). A listener’s 
relationship with the composer is a sort of indirect encounter, mediated 
by the music. However, the reality maintaining the function of such 
indirect social relationships is based on the fact that they are echoes 
or remembrances of a more fundamental type of social relationship: 
The face-to-face encounter. 
2. The Musical Experience as Face-To-Face Interaction
Our experience of reality being meaningful requires that what 
we perceive can be ordered within a meaningful context (a symbolic 
universe, as Berger and Luckmann put it). But in addition to that, we 
need to know that the contexts and meanings that define our reality 
are also shared by our fellow men – that they perceive the world 
substantially in the same way as we do (Schütz 1964 (1953): 137). 
Don Quixote’s perception of the world in terms of fantastic chivalry 
novels – of, e.g., windmills as malicious giants in disguise, or a 
barber’s basin as a knight’s helmet – was coherent with the frame of 
4  This was also known for Max Weber when he wrote about the sociology of music. 
Cf. Blaukopf  2012 (1979): 41.
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interpretation he knew from his favourite literature. In his story, the 
comic elements consist of its conflict with other people’s perception 
of reality, and tragedy walks in when he finally recognizes it as a 
delusion. Alfred Schütz’ analysis of the novel serves the purpose of 
showing the difference between a privately perceived reality and a 
perception anchored in a shared interpretation communicated in the 
course of direct social interaction. 
In another essay, The Homecomer, Schütz (1964 (1945)) shows 
a more everyday instance of incoherence between an individual’s 
perception of reality and that of his environment. A soldier returning 
from the front finds himself incapable of communicating his wartime 
experiences in a meaningful way to those who stayed at home, and vice 
versa, despite frequent contact by letters written to and from the front. 
According to Schütz, the failure was due to the lack of direct, 
face-to-face interaction during the wartime events. Face-to-face 
interaction requires, as he explains, that the participants share the 
same space and time during the interaction; this makes them able 
to observe each other’s bodies, facial expressions, gestures etc., and 
read the effects of their own actions, as well as each other’s reactions 
to outer stimuli. Through face-to-face interaction, a shared frame for 
the interpretation of reality is intersubjectively created. Schütz calls 
it a basic social relationship, from which all other social relationships 
are derived (Ibid: 109f). This kind of interaction provides participants 
with the possibility of performing a “reality check” that other, indirect 
and mediated forms of communication lack. If, on the other hand, we 
find ourselves incapable of convincing ourselves of the existence of 
an intersubjective experience of the world, 
then the very possibility of establishing communication with any fellow-
men is destroyed. In such a crisis situation we become convinced that each 
of us lives in the impenetrable shell of his solipsistic prison, the Others 
becoming mere mirages to us, we to the Others, we to ourselves (Schütz 
1964 (1953): 143). 
This is, indeed, another description of the same experience 
that Camus referred to: of being an alien, a stranger. And there is 
something in music that fights that feeling. Listening to music together, 
possibly at a live concert, and playing (rehearsing or performing) 
music together are all instances of face-to-face communication (with 
a varying degree of intensity). Participants share, more or less, the 
same acoustic space, the same time (divided by the performers by 
means of rhythm and tone pitch into microstructures much finer than 
those defined by the musical notes or the performing tradition alone), 
and each other’s reactions to the musical events. Their initial frame 
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of interpretation – their understanding of the music – is roughly the 
same, but there are several different artistically acceptable (or should 
we say: meaningful?) ways of performing the same piece of music 
(Wittgenstein 1979: 155). The notes written by the composer are not 
reproduced mechanically, like by a music box, but their performance 
is modified by numerous rules of interpretation (Sundberg & Frydén 
1985: 68–71; Mazzola 2011: 143–146). 
However, as has been shown by computer simulations, even 
these rules cannot be applied straightforwardly: They need to be used 
in just the right proportion, and they frequently interfere with each 
other. The performers ultimately have to pick up the rules they find 
useful in the context and at the moment, and follow them to the extent 
that suits their intentions (Sundberg & Frydén 1985: 71). When 
playing together, musicians catch and react to each other’s intentions; 
when enjoying music, the listener adopts the performers’ intentions 
and shares their way of structuring time. 
3. Interaction Without Words 
All Arts, even if they grow from a common root, are strictly 
divided as to their outgrowth. Where Poetry ends, Music starts. 
Where the poet finds no more words, the musician shall make 
appearance with his tones. 
Franz Grillparzer (1893 (1821))5
It is not unusual to talk about “the language of music”. 
However, the adequacy of this metaphor can be questioned. In 
Kant’s (1914 (1790): § 53) hierarchy of Beautiful Arts, music has 
the lowest place because its effect on humans is based on a play 
with bodily sensations. “The art of tone” speaks without concepts 
and “does not, like poetry, leave anything over for reflection”. 
Schopenhauer, when constructing his own hierarchy of the Arts a 
generation later, gives music the foremost position, but for a similar 
reason: Music is not a representation of anything else. “Music is 
[not] like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the copy of the 
will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are” (Schopenhauer 1909 
(1818): § 52). To explain “the meaning” of a piece of music or a 
musical phrase amounts either to an analysis of its references to 
other music or to acoustic phenomena outside music, or when this is 
not possible, to contents of the musical experience. The latter kinds 
5  A similar dictum is frequently, but without reference, attributed to Grillparzer’s con-
temporary, E. T. A. Hoffmann (“Where human language ends, music starts”). However, 
I have not been able to trace where, if at all, Hoffmann might have written this. 
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of explanation tend to remain diffuse or outright platitudes when 
expressed in words (Wittgenstein 1979: 132–133).6 References to 
other music can be about internal intertextuality (thematic work, 
the Leitmotiv technique) or stylistic pastiches (say, the introduction 
of ragtime rhythms or baroque polyphony in a post-modernist 
concert piece). References to acoustic phenomena outside music 
are, in turn, well-known to everybody who has listened to, for 
example, some of the polkas of the Strauss Brothers, introducing 
locomotives, a blacksmith’s hammer against the anvil, sleigh bells, 
etc. We are surprised or amused (and sometimes not) by such effects 
for the very reason that they add to the music an element that is 
usually not there. And there are of course different combinations of 
these various kinds of musical reference: The birds (flutes) singing 
in numerous forests built of French horns and harps in romantic 
concert pieces; or in films, the attics and cellars filled by ghosts, 
vampires and post-Wagnerian tonalities; and so on. What is often 
overlooked by those engaged in musical semiotics is that “musical 
phenomena are semiotic in nature only insofar as they do not stand 
for themselves, but for something else” (Mirigliano 1995: 55). In 
this sense, musical semiotics is not concerned with music, but with 
what music is not. 
The Austrian music sociologist Kurt Blaukopf (2012 (2000): 23) 
distinguished between semantic and aesthetic information in music. 
The former means that the sound event is a carrier of meaning, and 
thus pronounceable and translatable into another language; the latter 
is not. It is only the former that can be subjected to semiotic analysis. 
Along with the autonomisation of music as an art form distinct from 
other social activities, its aesthetic character has become ever more 
pronounced. So, for example, there is a tendency of modern composers 
to avoid associations both to non-musical reality and to other music 
alike. This can, for instance, be seen in the avoidance of programmatic 
titles, and even of titles that refer to existing musical forms. 
When stressing the untranslatable elements in music, I may 
seem to contradict myself. Did I not, in the musical example I showed 
above, point at the way in which tonal ambiguity and a confirmation 
of the main tonality correspond to the dramatics of Goethe’s lyrics? 
However, the tension created and released in this piece of music is not 
6  Cf. Schönberg’s explanation of the contents of a sequence in his Piano Concerto: 
“Life was so easy 
Suddenly hatred broke out
A grave situation was created
But life goes on.”
(Quoted in Martin 1995: 66. “Even the publishers of Christmas cards look for a bit 
more sophistication than this in their texts”, Martin comments.)
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dependent on its combination with the contents of the poem – it can 
also be experienced by somebody who does not know the German 
language. When saying this, I do not deny the close connection there 
is between music and verbal interaction. 
The way in which music can underline a verbal message, or in 
instrumental passages, imitate verbal interaction, was already well 
known to composers and musical theorists in the 18th century, and 
even before then (e.g., Grétry 1978 (1789)). A musical theme can feel 
like a sentence, and the way in which a musical work proceeds can 
be compared with rhetoric (as Wittgenstein points out, cf. Hanfling 
2004: 153–159). Music has not only been compared with language 
but, more fittingly, with interaction. The basic features of any social 
interaction include such “adjacency pairs” as question and answer, 
greeting and response, invitation or suggestion and acceptance/
refusal, statement and agreement/disagreement, and so on. During 
the interaction, the participants also take the positions of “with-
actors” and “counter-actors” vis-à-vis each other, either focusing 
on the messages sent by their partners, or foregrounding their own 
agency (Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Stefanović and Kahri 2011). All 
these features of communication are also reflected and emphasized in 
ordinary speech by a variation of pitch, loudness and rhythm in the 
speakers’ voices. Based on an acoustic analysis of everyday speech 
situations, a study by Stefanović and Kahri (Ibid: 291–295) identifies 
such signifiers of co- or counter-agency as intensity of voice, tone 
pitch, pitch range (ambitus) of the spoken phrase, and the contrast 
or continuation of the melodic line or rhythm of the phrase of the 
previous speaker. 
This is not unlike what Goethe wrote about the string quartet 
(quoted in Drabkin 2000: 3): “One hears four intelligent people 
conversing with one another, believes one might learn something 
from their discourse, and recognize the special characteristics of 
their instruments”. Music reminds one of the prosody of speech. 
“Adjacency pairs” and actor roles similar to those in verbal 
interaction can be discerned by an analysis of the relationships 
between a vocal or instrumental soloist and the accompaniment, 
between different soloists and between different musical themes. The 
acoustic measures used for structuring the interaction are the same 
as appear in verbal interaction; to those, one can add the closeness to 
or distance from the prevailing tonality. In order to be experienced 
as interaction, the music does not need the support of any verbal 
message. The tension between tonality and tonal ambiguity of the 
previous musical example from Schubert’s Alder King can, but 
does not need to be, interpreted as representing a tension between 
a marginal experience and an intersubjective reality, in the same 
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way as the perpetual motion in the accompaniment can, but does 
not need to, represent a horse ride. The additional meanings created 
by song lyrics or a programmatic title are outside, and additional 
to, the music. It is here that the listeners’ extra-musical experiences 
enter a dialogue with their immediate musical experience. What 
we find in the music itself is motion (or, rather, the appearance of 
motion (Scruton 1989: 90) or, maybe more correctly, the sounding 
result of the musician’s physical motion) and harmonic tension – 
not “symbols” of motion and harmonic tension. To understand the 
music is to recognize the gesture it enacts, as Roger Scruton (Ibid: 
95) formulates (again, echoing Wittgenstein – cf. Sharpe 2004: 144 
f.). We should add that the enjoyment brought forward by such 
recognition is explained by the feeling of being in touch with the 
composer, the musicians, with other human beings. 
To sum up the argumentation up to this point: the type of 
interaction we have been focusing on is of course “staged” to the 
extent that it is pre-determined by the written notes. This makes it 
in part an indirect social relationship between the composer and the 
performer. When rehearsed or performed by several musicians, the 
freedom they have in their individual interpretation of the musical 
text makes the playing also a form of face-to-face communication 
among themselves. The string quartet – “the conversation between 
four intelligent people” – did in fact historically emerge first as a 
form of entertainment between the playing musicians themselves, not 
for audiences (Barrett-Aynes 1974: 71). In concert, also the listeners 
become involved in the communication, albeit in a more passive 
way. The music’s questions and answers, greetings and responses 
unite the listeners, performers and composers in an intersubjectively 
shared meaningful world. What is peculiar about this interaction is 
that it does not involve communication on anything specific save the 
communication itself; it is communication on communication, or 
interaction with the sole purpose of interacting.
We are here dealing with a fundamental, non-reducible form of 
sociality. It is what remains when we take all possible forms of social 
interaction and boil them down to what is their common denominator: 
the interaction itself. It is the “inter-mental” scenery that Gabriel 
Tarde (1843–1904), one of sociology’s side-tracked founding fathers, 
regarded as the cornerstone of social life. As an example, he considers 
conversation – or what we might call small talk: 
By conversation, I mean every dialogue that involves no direct or 
foreseeable gain, meaning that one talks mainly for the sake of talking, for 
the enjoyment, like a game, for courtesy (as quoted by Asplund 1987: 168). 
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Besides music (or small talk), there are numerous other examples 
of social interaction that are not essentially dependent on references 
to anything outside the interaction itself and its basic rules: playing 
football, eating together, making love, etc.7 But also communication 
referring to any subject external to the communication itself requires 
that we accept our counterparts’ status as communicating agents and 
are responsive to their actions (cf. Lagerspetz 2015: 122–123). Indeed, 
a readiness to be engaged in an interaction about “nothing”, or about 
the mere interaction itself, is a precondition to any interaction at all 
about “something”. In this sense, the essence of music is the same as 
the essence of sociality itself. 
4. Exclusion and Non-Interaction
Saying that music is interaction of a specific type means that 
it shares basic preconditions and possibilities with other types of 
interaction. It does not of course mean that they are always there – 
that musical communication always involves inclusion and mutual 
recognition, or that music always creates an intersubjectively shared 
understanding. This can be said as little of musical, as indeed of any 
other kind of interaction. Some of the most intriguing sociological 
real-life experiments known were conducted by Harold L. Garfinkel 
and his disciples in the 1950s and 60s. A number of them included 
staging situations where the basic structure of human communication 
was deliberately violated. For instance, the experimenters came to 
their parental homes and treated their close family members as if they 
were strangers. The usual response to these and similar instances of 
out-of-place behaviour was irritation and confusion (Garfinkel 1964). 
The demonstrations were done in order to make visible, among other 
things, the standard, taken-for-granted communicative practices – 
such as mutual adherence to shared background knowledge and rules 
of communication. From the point of view of our present discussion, 
Garfinkel’s experiments are illustrative of two issues: first, disturbing 
the basic structure of communication is fairly easy; and second, such 
a disturbance is also easily recognized and strongly reacted upon. 
The very fact that we expect inclusion from communication 
means, by default, that every communicative act can also be easily 
used in order to exclude, and to confront. The history and present 
practice of musical performances provide ample evidence of both. 
The introduction of new rhythms and tonalities was consciously used 
by musical modernists in order to alienate one part of the public and 
7  The very fact that these activities easily can become attached with many different 
symbolic meanings indeed proves that they as such, as activities, lack any. 
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to engage another. The performance of certain music for a certain 
public may also make a deliberate statement about the public’s non-
inclusion in a respected tradition, or in an emerging one. A group of 
jazz musicians playing a dance gig for an uninterested public can 
often only sneak it into its performance of the other kind of music 
that it has been hired to play (Becker 2004: 26); this can also become 
a form of ironic musical joking. A musician or a band may choose not 
to involve the listeners, to ignore, to mock or to challenge them. But 
this is also a form of interaction.
There is still one more, more serious instance of failure of a 
communicative situation, one in which the communicative act has 
lost its capacities of both including and excluding. What in normal 
circumstances constitutes communication is reduced to automatized 
gestures that neither require nor create any field of intersubjectively 
shared meaning. A condition resulting from non-voluntary exposure 
to social interaction is known as burn-out (Asplund 1987: 140, 150). 
That is, an asocial irresponsivity, the inability of, for example, a so-
cial worker, teacher, police officer, psychotherapist or a health care 
professional to treat his or her clients, students or patients as individ-
ual persons – as something more than mere “cases”. If we compare 
their working conditions with the continuous presence of music in 
public places (cf. Smiers 2012), how might the latter influence our 
capability of becoming engaged in the interaction it invites us to? We 
close our ears and minds. It might not be easy to open them up again, 
to restore the responsivity that we have been forced to lose.
5. A Problematic for the Sociology of Arts
As sociologists, we are seldom able to escape the realm of 
words. When describing social facts and social practices, we are 
heavily dependent on verbalized accounts. The sociological practice 
consists, to a large extent, of interpretation: Unique phenomena are 
placed within the larger context of social life. When doing that, we 
have to make use of concepts that refer to something more general. 
For instance, when analysing everyday life, we can thus make visible 
its underlying rules, routines and regularities, and relate them to the 
macro-level of social order (Scott 2009: 5). What might seem banal 
and uninteresting at first sight has a larger, meaningful context that 
sociology can reveal with the help of its words. 
At the same time, something always gets lost in the process of 
interpretation. Some of these concerns were addressed by Dorothy 
E. Smith (Smith 1987) in her seminal book, The Everyday World 
As Problematic. People’s actual everyday experiences cannot be 
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satisfactorily described by means of a sociological discourse that 
derives its concepts from elsewhere; thus, she proposes a shift in 
approach (Ibid: 98): 
The conception of an everyday life as a sociological problematic presents 
a basis for a sociology that, like Marx and Engel’s [sic] conception of the 
materialist method, begins not within the discourse but in the actual daily 
relations between individuals. 
For this reason, Smith considers such concepts as “class”, “cul-
ture”, or “meaning” misleading, insofar as they refer to something 
pre-given, subjectlessly present. The main point in her criticism 
against sociology is that it gives pre-eminence over practice to an 
allegedly objective discourse. It is, instead, from the practice itself 
than the concepts should be derived. 
However, for the sociology of the Arts, this is just one part 
of the problem. The arts do, by definition, endeavour to bring about 
experiences that are untranslatable to any other form of expression; 
in a way, a sociologist of the arts is trying to perform Baron Münch-
hausen’s trick of lifting oneself up from a swamp by grasping one’s 
own hair (or, pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps). To analyse 
them is, to a certain extent, to banalise them. 
The arts sociologists’ answer to this dilemma has most often been 
to turn away from the arts themselves and to focus instead on the social 
fields and activities that surround them. In the footsteps of Bourdieu, 
they conduct analyses of how art professionals or different segments 
of the public are located vis-à-vis different artistic forms and practic-
es. When demystifying the artistic experience and revealing the social 
hierarchies lying behind aesthetic judgment, Bourdieu showed how a 
specific artefact in some circumstances can become a means of cultural 
distinction, in some others not. His analyses of the arts tell how and 
why aesthetic value comes to be conferred on an object, but he does not 
focus on the other things that an artistic experience is about. However, 
even his often-subtle discussion on the specific features of an artistic 
style and possible reasons of its appeal to a certain type of taste (e.g., 
1984 (1979): 18–19) is something that his latter-day followers mostly 
fail to continue. In their analyses, the arts themselves remain strangely 
invisible. Usually unanswered is, e.g. the question about what there 
is in the substance of a specific art form or a piece of art that makes it 
correspond to the aspirations of a certain individual or social group, 
specifically positioned. In the same way, there is a not insubstantial 
body of research on subcultures in which a certain type of music is an 
important marker of identity; at the same time, there is little analysis 
about what the specific traits in the music are that make it able to serve 
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such a function. A very real danger is that such analyses remain general 
and superficial. Could the same function be served by other music: is 
the music itself here anything more than an empty signifier? 
When analysing the arts as forms of interaction, we should also 
consider exclusion and non-interaction. That is, the ways used to de-
liberately exclude parts of the public from the interaction; and the 
effects that constant, unasked-for exposure to music may have on 
people’s capacity of responsivity to music. 
And to conclude with a question from yet one more angle: The 
power that a joint musical experience has in forging strong emotional 
ties is shown by the frequency of friendships, amorous relations and 
even marriages built on such foundations; but how much do we know 
about them? Are musicians better lovers (or are they perhaps worse)?
The issues I took up here are certainly not the only ones that a 
view of musical expression and experience as intersubjectivity calls 
upon, and they are maybe not even the most important ones. But the 
fact remains that sociology of the arts, in the same way as all forms of 
sociology, needs to penetrate the phenomenon itself, which lies at the 
core of the social activities analysed, and not be content with leaving 
it in a black box. 
6. Coda
A challenge for the sociology of the arts is to bring the arts 
themselves back to the analysis that is at present largely concerned 
with issues around them. I suggest that the view presented here of 
music – and probably the arts in general – as a basic form and ex-
pression of sociality could open a hitherto largely unexplored field 
of inquiry for the sociology of the arts. At the same time one should 
see, that when I depict music as a form of sociality – of interaction 
– I do not mean only a sphere of mutual acceptance and affirmation. 
Interaction has also the potential of belittlement, confrontation, and 
exclusion. However, when that has been the intention, we are still 
dealing with genuine interaction. 
And what, then, about Beethoven? I have no pretension of 
being a Beethoven expert. What has been discussed in this essay 
applies, to a large extent, to Western tonal concert music, and to some 
extent, even more generally to music of any kind. A precondition to 
the experience of music as meaningful and as a form of interaction 
is of course, that the participants recognize a familiar musical idiom 
as a frame of reference – otherwise, the acoustic phenomena will 
not be interpreted as music, but as meaningless noise. The better 
the participants know it and the better they like it, the easier it will 
be for them to engage in the interaction; in this respect it makes no 
237
Mikko Lagerspetz  Music as Intersubjectivity – A Problematic...
difference whether they are friends of Beethoven’s or Bob Dylan’s 
music. A tonal system or a recognizable musical style establishes 
a frame of reference, within which the musical gestures will be 
experienced as an interaction. Despite being interaction about 
“nothing”, without reference to anything outside the interaction itself 
and its basic rules, music possesses all the definitive features of an 
interactive situation. The musical experience includes the perception 
of a dynamics of interaction between participants in different roles. 
Everybody involved is engaged in a quest for a shared understanding 
of the interactive process, either as an active performer or as a 
listener. Even if the interaction lacks any such specific content that 
could be reduced to a verbal explanation, it bears within it a profound 
message: the message about our placement in a shared world, in 
which interaction between human beings is possible.
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Мико Лагерспец
МУЗИКА КАО ИНТЕРСУБЈЕКТИВНОСТ – ПИТАЊА ЗА 
СОЦИОЛОГИЈУ УМЕТНОСТИ
(Резиме)
Полазна тачка овог огледа јесте опажање да музичко искуство током 
периодаојађености и трауматичних доживљаја може довести до обнављања 
човекове вере у вредност живота. То искуство може повратити осећај повеза-
ности с другим људским бићима и потврдити постојање смислене реалности. 
Објашњење се тражи у начинима на које музика ствара (или пак опонаша 
– када је посредована партитуром или снимком), ситуацију у којој учесници 
доживљавају иста искуства током заједнички проведеног времена. С ослон-
цем на радове Алфреда Шица (Alfred Schütz) и Бергера и Лукмана (Peter L. 
Berger & Thomas Luckmann), интеракција лицем у лице види се као основно 
средство преко којег су људи у стању да спроведу „проверу стварности” пред 
хаосом, осећањем бесмисла и нереалности. Међутим, музика се разликује од 
већине других облика интеракције у том смислу што она не зависи од ос-
лањања на било коју другу стварност изван саме комуникационе ситуације. 
Музичке појаве по природи су знаковне само утолико уколико не предста-
вљају саме себе, већ нешто друго. У базичном смислу, музичка интеракција 
„није ни о чему”; у том смислу, она је пример „чисте социјалности”.
Када описујемо друштвене чињенице и друштвене праксе, ми у великој 
мери зависимо од речи и појмова. У исто време, уметности, по дефиниији, 
настоје да створе доживљај да су непреводиве у било који други вид изра-
за. Одговор социолога уметности на ову дилему често је био одвраћање од 
самих уметности и, уместо тога, усредсређивање на друштвена подручја и 
активности које их окружују. Оглед сугерише поглед на музику као интерак-
цију која ствара интерсубјективно подељено искуство. У исто време, признаје 
се да музика, слично свакој другој врсти интеракције, такође може подба-
цити у овоме, или пак бити намерно искоришћена за искључење. Бројни су 
примери ситуација у којима је темељна структура комуникације нарушена. 
Примерице, неке Гарфинкелове (Harold L. Garfinkel) етнометодолошке сту-
дије показују колико се лако такав прекршај може начинити и, истовремено, 
колико га је једноставно препознати као одступање од стандардног обрасца. 
Различити начини искључивања и сукобљавања постоје и у музичкој комуни-
кацији; међутим, ово више потврђује него што побија виђење инклузије као 
њеног подразумеваног облика. С друге стране, недобровољно излагање музи-
ци на јавним местима може уназадити нашу способност да доживимо музику 
као облик интеракције. Овај оглед позива на дискусију о могућним примена-
ма ове перспективе у социолошким и културолошким истраживањима.
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